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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION—REVIEW ON APPEAL FROM DENIAL OF
INJUNCTION—THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING P LAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A P RELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHERE
P LAINTIFFS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE A REASONABLE P ROBABILITY THAT
THE STATUTE AT ISSUE WILL BE INVALIDATED — Brian B. v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Education, 230 F.3d 582
(3d Cir. 2000).
Pennsylvania citizens, ages six through twenty-one, have the right to a
free public education until graduation from high school. Brian B. v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Deparment of Education, 230 F.3d 582,
584 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 24 P A. STAT . ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (West 2000)).
Pennsylvania has extended this right to juvenile delinquents and youths
sentenced as adults to state correctional institutions by providing them with
full education programs. Under Pennsylvania statute, 24 P A. CONS. STAT .
§ 13-1306.2(a) (Subsection A), however, juveniles ni carcerated in adult
county correctional facilities for criminal convictions are treated like
expelled students. Id. at 584-85. Consequently, these convicted juveniles
under the age of seventeen receive minimum educational services. Id. at
585. Juveniles seventeen years of age or older receive no education.
Because of the dichotomy under Pennsylvania law, the determinative
factor in deciding whether a youth convicted as an adult receives a full
education is the location of his or her incarceration. The place of
imprisonment is determined by the length of the sentence and the
sentencing judge’s discretion. Youth offenders serving up to two years are
sent to county correction centers. Youth offenders sentenced for five years
or more go to state facilities. Sentencing judges have the authority to
choose the appropriate locale for juveniles sentenced between two and five
years.
An exception to Subsection A created another distinction between
convicted juveniles receiving full educational benefits and those receiving
minimal or no education. This exception granted full educational services
to all school-aged pretrial detainees and all students needing special
education due to a disability.
A group of juveniles, who were denied education under Subsection A,
filed a class action suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania against the defendants Pennsylvania Department
of Education (DOE), its secretary, and three local school districts. Id. at
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584. Applying the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and using a rational basis test, the district court held that the plaintiffs did
not demonstrate the reasonable likelihood of success required for a
preliminary injunction. Id. at 585. The district court, therefore, denied the
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of
Subsection A. Id. at 584.
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Id. The plaintiffs argued
that the district court erred by failing to apply intermediate scrutiny review
under Plyler v. Doe, because Subsection A detrimentally affects education.
Id. at 585 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)). The plaintiffs
alternatively asserted that even if this more stringent standard is rejected by
the court, Subsection A should be barred from enforcement because it is
not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion
for a preliminary injunction, because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the Pennsylvania statute, which restricts the
education of juveniles sentenced as adults to county correctional facilities,
will be invalidated. Id. at 588. Circuit Judge Stapleton, writing for the
majority of the court, began his analysis by listing the factors a court must
consider when deciding whether or not to grant a motion for a preliminary
injunction. Id. at 585. The moving party must show, according to the
judge: (1) a demonstrated probability of success on the merits; (2)
demonstrated irreparable harm to the movant; (3) significant harm to the
nomoving party; and (4) the effect on the public’s interest. Id. Judge
Stapleton then explained the circuit court’s method of review. Id. First,
the majority stated that the appellate court reviews the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo. Id. Second, the majority explained that the appellate
court reviews the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Id. Third,
the majority clarified that the appellate court verifies that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in granting or denying the preliminary
injunction. Id.
Next, the court clarified the court’s reasoning for rejecting the
heightened scrutiny standard applied in Plyler v. Doe, a Supreme Court
case challenging a statute that prevented the allocation of state money to
educate children of illegal aliens. Id. at 586 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982)). Judge Stapleton articulated that the Supreme Court applied
intermediate scrutiny in Plyler because of the “unique circumstances” in
which innocent children were being denied education due to the unlawful
actions of their parents. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
The court distinguished Plyler from the present case by emphasizing that
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the juveniles here are being deprived of equal educational services due to
their own illegal actions. Id. The court, therefore, rejected the application
of heightened scrutiny and continued to analyze the case under a rational
basis review. Id.
The majority indicated that a statute that does not infringe upon a
fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class will be deemed
constitutional if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. The
court, moreover, suggested that the plaintiffs must show that the
classification is wholly irrational to rebut the statute’s presumption of
validity. Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs can demonstrate this
irrationality by disproving every justification for the classification. Id.
Next, Judge Stapleton legitimized the defendant’s justifications for
Subsection A’s distinction between juvenile offenders incarcerated in
county facilities and juvenile offenders imprisoned in state institutions. Id.
at 586-88. The court conceded that the statute’s effect of limiting
education services provided to juveniles in adult county correctional
facilities was rationally related to the legitimate concern about insufficient
space in a few local adult correctional facilities. Id. at 587 The majority
then asserted that it was improper to second-guess the legislature’s decision
to reduce high per student costs in county facilities by limiting the
education of convicted juveniles incarcerated in local adult correctional
facilities. Id. at 587-88.
Judge Stapleton justified the excluded classes under Subsection A by
reasoning that (1) pretrial detainees have not yet been pronounced guilty,
(2) special education students have a greater need for education than the
average student, and (3) educating all youths in juvenile facilities is less
costly because all the inmates are students. Id. at 587. The legislature’s
decision to provide full education benefits to juvenile inmates in state
facilities, the court noted, was rationally related to its intent to avoid
security problems agitated by the suspension of existing education
programs in state correctional facilities. Id. at 588. The court also
validated the defendants’ position that state inmates, who are generally
imprisoned for longer sentences, would benefit more from scholastic
programs than county inmates, who are incarcerated for less than five
years. Id. at 587-88.
After holding that Subsection A is rationally related to the
legislature’s legitimate state interest, the court distinguished the present
case from Romer v. Evans. Id. at 588 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996)). The majority noted that in Romer, the Supreme Court found no
rational basis exists where a specific class of individuals, homosexuals, is
denied a right based on a single trait. Id. (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633,
635). The court concluded that, unlike in Romer, a rational basis exists in
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the present case because the class of youths is not identifiable by one trait.
Id. Moreover, the court noted that the youths’ burden is limited to an
educational context. Id. Based upon this conclusion, the circuit court
affirmed the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary
injunction. Id.
In her dissent, Judge Roth agreed with the majority that the case
should be analyzed under a rational basis test, but criticized the court for
giving too much deference to the Pennsylvania legislature. Id. at 588-89
(Roth, J., dissenting).
Judge Roth asserted that Subsection A’s
discrimination against juvenile county inmates does not meet a rational
basis test for several reasons. Id. at 589 (Roth, J., dissenting). Judge Roth
stated that education should not be denied arbitrarily to one group because
of the potential detrimental impact it would have on both the “basic
institutions” of our country and “the life of the child.” Id. at 589-90 (Roth,
J., dissenting) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)). The
dissent also advised that the court should scrutinize the equal protection
rights of prisoners because the legislature might not. Id. at 590 (Roth, J.,
dissenting). The dissent concluded that the defendants’ justifications for
denying this particular group access to education were inconsistent, and
therefore, not rationally related to the government’s asserted interests. Id.
The dissent, thereafter, demonstrated the arbitrariness of the five
classifications created by Subsection A. Id. at 590-93 (Roth, J., dissenting).
First, the dissent stated that the plaintiffs have rebutted the defendants’
claim that youths incarcerated in adult, county facilities must be denied
educational services due to inadequate space. Id. at 590-91 (Roth, J.,
dissenting). According to Judge Roth, this justification of inadequate space
is arbitrary because the facilities make space for the education of pre-trial
detainees and special education students. Id. at 591 (Roth, J., dissenting).
In addition, the dissent noted that the concern about inadequate space is
tenuous because the number of juvenile inmates in the local facility
changes every day and the dilemma of inadequate space can be remedied
through proper prioritizing by the DOE. Id.
The dissent also rejected the defendant’s second justification
concerning high per-pupil costs in adult county facilities. Id. (Roth, J.,
dissenting). The DOE, the dissent claimed, would have prohibited
education in all county facilities if it were truly worried about curtailing
expenditures on the education of prisoners. Id. Judge Roth proposed that
utilizing technological advances, like “closed-circuit television,” in
correctional facilities could provide educational opportunities to several
groups at a lower cost. Id. In addition, the dissent opined that the
Pennsylvania DOE’s decision to provide educational services to some
county inmates and not to others is arbitrary in itself, and therefore, does
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not even justify a legitimate goal to minimize state expenses. Id. at 592
(Roth, J., dissenting).
The dissent further questioned the defendants’ argument that pre-trial
detainees are properly excluded, because they have not yet been found
guilty. Id. at 591 (Roth, J., dissenting). The defendants’ assertion, Judge
Roth insisted, is not rationally related to the purpose of the statute and
infers that convicted juveniles in state facilities should be prohibited from
receiving education. Id. Next, the dissent argued that even though the
defendants claim that special education students are entitled to free public
education under federal law, the statute is still unjustifiable. Id. Judge
Roth continued her analysis by rejecting the defendants’ third
justification—that state inmates would benefit more from educational
services than would county inmates. Id. at 592 (Roth, J., dissenting). The
dissent recognized that the defendants’ argument that state inmates are “too
transient” is undermined by the fact that pretrial detainees, who are an even
“more transient class,” are granted the right to full educational benefits. Id.
The dissent also noted that some state inmates are incarcerated for a shorter
time than some county inmates because those youths sentenced between
two and five years may be imprisoned in either facility based on the judge’s
discretion. Id. The judge, therefore, declared that the defendants’
reasoning that state inmates are less likely to go back to school is flawed.
Id.
Judge Roth, continuing her dissent, characterized the defendants’
intention to prevent security problems in state prisons as irrelevant, because
the plaintiffs were not arguing that education should be denied to youths in
state facilities. Id. The dissent also attacked the attenuated relationship
between expelled students and convicted youths. Id. at 592-93 (Roth, J.,
dissenting). Convicted juveniles should not be treated like expelled
students, purported the dissent, because there is no rational connection
between the two groups. Id. at 593 (Roth, J., dissenting). Judge Roth
distinguished the two groups by pointing out that a student, who is expelled
from school for violating school rules, is denied only a free public
education. Id. The dissent proffered that an expelled student can continue
his or her education in a private school but a juvenile delinquent cannot
choose an alternative education program. Id. Judge Roth concluded that
because she believes the plaintiffs have demonstrated a reasonable
probability of success on the merits, the case should be remanded to the
trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs proved the necessary
elements for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 594 (Roth, J., dissenting).
Brian B. exemplifies a situation in which the court struggles between
its duty to enforce constitutional principles, such as the Equal Protection
Clause, and its duty to refrain from judicial intervention into legislative
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determinations. It also demonstrates the difficulty in determining whether
legislative action is rationally related to a legitimate interest, or whether the
government’s justification is mere pretext disguised as a lawful purpose.
The majority’s opinion reflects a strong desire to justify the
legislature’s actions. This justification is demonstrated by the majority’s
continuous effort to avoid second-guessing the legislature and by its brief,
indulgent review of the defendants’ reasoning. Although some deference
to the legislature is necessary, the majority created reasons to support the
defendants.
Judge Roth’s detailed dissent, however, realistically
demonstrated that the defendants’ intentions do not relate to the denial of
education to a narrowly defined group of individuals. As Judge Roth
stated, the majority failed to recognize the inconsistencies in the
defendants’ justifications. See id. at 590, 593 (Roth, J., dissenting).
Although rational basis review is a lenient standard, it deserves careful
consideration, especially where such important issues like education and
equal protection are concerned. While the court has decided to dismiss the
plaintiff’s challenges, the legislature may want to more carefully consider
the dissent’s thorough analysis.
Rebecca A. Oleksy

